# Hospitality Industry: Enhanced Suspicious Activity Awareness Assists in Terrorism Prevention


From family-owned lodging to chain properties and luxury resorts, the hospitality industry represents a diverse and complex environment, including an open and welcoming operating model, transient populations, multi-use facilities, conference spaces, bars, restaurants, casinos, gyms, pools, business centers and ballrooms. With approximately 53,000 lodging properties and over 15 million people employed by the hospitality industry in the US, a well-trained and security conscious staff can act as a

force multiplier for recognition and reporting of suspicious activity potentially indicative of terrorism within or adjacent to their respective facilities. Hospitality security stakeholders should proactively work toward an improved security culture, which helps protect their staff, the public and the property from terrorism. Some of the activities described in this document may be constitutionally protected, and any determination of illicit intent should be supported by facts justifying reasonable suspicion. Any one activity or behavior may be individually insignificant, but when observed in combination with other suspicious behavior—particularly advocating violence—may constitute a basis for reporting.

STAFF TRAINING: The best and most cost-effective security technique is a well-trained staff that can recognize and react appropriately to a potential or actual threat. Training should highlight the importance of security, things to look for, and what to do in the event of an incident or attack. Staff should be highly encouraged if not rewarded—to report situations which may be suspicious, hazardous or potentially dangerous. Hospitality facilities make security inherently challenging because of their size, layout, and amenities, and alert staff will be prepared to detect suspicious activity. Most personnel will not retain information from a single training or briefing event, so consider regularly delivering refresher and updated training to reinforce key messages and instruction. Hospitality industry staff should also understand the terrorist planning cycle which will improve their ability to identify suspicious activity.

**SCOPE:** This product is intended to promote awareness in the hospitality industry to enhance security and safety against terrorist activities. Hospitality industry security starts with complete comprehensive background screening during the hiring process, and includes suspicious activity awareness training, evaluation of policies and processes, and incorporates the latest technology.

The attack planning cycle often provides observable indicators, allowing hotel employees, third-party observers, and first responders to identify behaviors and activities potentially related to terrorism. Pre-attack surveillance, training, and rehearsal are the stages that are often observable and can offer opportunities to identify plots and prevent attacks.





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**NOTICE:** This product was developed by the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT), which is a collaboration by NCTC, DHS, the FBI, and state, local, tribal, and territorial government personnel to improve information sharing and enhance public safety. The product is intended to promote coordination among intergovernmental authorities and the private sector in identifying, preventing, and responding to foreign terrorist activities in the US. The product should be considered within the context of existing laws, authorities, agreements, policies or procedures. For additional information contact us at JCAT@NCTC.GOV.

- Be observant. Report attempts to access restricted areas or avoid security measures.
- Be attentive. Report unusual interest or inquiries about the facility, including the hotel staff operating procedures, shift changes, closed-circuit TV systems (CCTV), events, other guests, and neighboring sites, including government, military, police, communications, or power facilities.
- Be watchful. Report unattended luggage, packages, or vehicles in or adjacent to facilities.

**REGISTRATION DESK**: Suspicious activities and behaviors may be observed through a variety of indicators. Some of these indicators on their own may appear to be innocent but—when combined with other indicators—may indicate potential attack planning. Maintain security-minded service through responsive interactions with customers while following established security protocols, especially those requiring identification, room cards, or tickets. Be aware of:

- Refusal to provide required professional or personal details on hotel registrations, such as place of employment, contact information, or place of residence.
- Requests to keep a guest's presence at the premises confidential.
- Recurring short-duration departure extensions over a prolonged period.
- Use of cash for large purchases or credit card in a name different than the registered guest.
- Making frequent or extensive modifications to the hotel registration, including removing or adding guests.
- Unusual interest in hotel security or hotel access points, including main, alternate, and emergency entrances and exits.
- Requests for specific rooms, floors, or other locations in the hotel, particularly those not considered premium choices and when coinciding with special events located on or in the vicinity of the premises.
- Seemingly purposeful attempts to use entrances and exits that avoid the lobby, cameras, and hotel staff or attempts to mask identity in vicinity of cameras.

Efforts to hide weapons, precursor materials, and components may include innocuous and diverse containers. While hard-sided protective cases are common in transporting firearms, artful concealment may include standard luggage, sporting or recreational equipment cases, shipping containers, or commercial product boxes.





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**CONCIERGE:** Interaction with guests and visitors may reveal specific or unusual questions regarding security procedures, other access/egress points, facility infrastructure, or requests to circumvent a hotel policy. Watch for:

- Signs of unusual content in luggage, cases, bags and boxes, including weight, size, or other noteworthy characteristics.
- Amount or type of luggage inconsistent with numbers of guests or length of stay.
- Strong desire to handle particular items of luggage or strongly refusing assistance with numerous or heavy luggage.
- Luggage that seems devoid of content.
- Seemingly unusual weight, size, or frequency of deliveries to an individual or room.

**VALET/TRANSPORTATION SERVICES** should be alert for attempts to access restricted parking areas, seemingly abandoned or illegally parked vehicles, and vehicles which appear unusually weighted down or modified. Look for:

- Presence of large items concealed by blankets or tarps, or are emitting an unusual chemical odor.
- A liquid substance, not normally associated with a vehicle, observed leaking from the passenger compartment or the trunk.
- Deception techniques including cloned, rented, or stolen vehicles which may be used to impersonate.
- Use of stolen or fraudulent documentation including passes, license plates, bills of lading, permits, or licenses.
- A driver who seems unfamiliar with the contents of the vehicle, the purpose of the visit, or vehicle being driven.

**MAINTENANCE, HOUSEKEEPING, AND ROOM SERVICE STAFF** during daily routines may observe behaviors, activities or items which may create suspicion, specifically weapons or precursor materials, and their storage and use. Tip-offs include:

- Denial of cleaning or maintenance services.
- Altered, disabled or removed fire alarms and smoke detectors.
- Weapons or ammunition.
- Unusual odors, such as cleaning solvents, fuel, chemical products, or evidence these chemicals were in the room, including containers (which may have had the labels removed), wrappers, labels, as well as stains in the sink, shower or tub.
- Laboratory equipment.
- Burn marks or discoloration on the walls, floors, or doors.
- Extended stays with little baggage or unpacked luggage.
- Not leaving room for extended period of time.
- Hastily departing a room without checking out, leaving behind luggage or seemingly significant belongings.
- Evidence of wiring or soldering, and presence of electronic components, electrical tape, batteries, soldering guns, and wires.



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- Presence of materials which could be used as shrapnel, including nuts, ball bearings, screws or nails.
- Extensive notes, pictures, technical drawings or maps of the surrounding area of no tourist value.
- Publications associated with terrorism.
- Efforts by guest to change their appearance or attire style.
- Attempted access to areas which are restricted or otherwise designated for staffonly.

**HME/IED CONSIDERATIONS:** Most precursor chemicals, components, and equipment used for homemade explosives (HMEs) have commercial uses and are legal to obtain, making the detection of explosives development challenging. It is important for hotel staff to be familiar with components, precursors, equipment, and tools associated with HME construction so they may recognize related activities. Staff should conduct follow-up with all guest complaints involving

odd noises or strong odors, as well as unexplained stains or discoloration on floors, walls, or ceilings, as environmental indicators may uncover suspicious activity.

NOTE: Efforts to develop HME or build IEDs are inherently dangerous as the precursors used may be extremely sensitive to impact, friction, static electricity and flames. Potential HMEs or IEDs must be treated accordingly until rendered safe by the proper authorities. Emergency plans should include instructions for rapid evacuation, isolation of the materials or devices, and notification to appropriate authorities to ensure the safety of staff and guests.

Images appeared in several issues of AQAP's Inspire magazine.



**SURROUNDING AREAS:** Security should include all amenities within the hotel, including ballrooms, convention halls, physical fitness centers, business offices, restaurants, multi-use facilities, pools, casinos, parking garages, loading docks and entertainment venues, but should also extend beyond the perimeter of the hotel and include neighboring venues and facilities. Special events create another set of challenges, which include potentially exposed locations during an emergency incident response. Recommended actions include:

- Hotel security should periodically perform risk, threat, and vulnerability assessments, to develop tailored security approaches, and routinely re-evaluate security measures and emergency response plans against the evolving terrorist trends and tactics whether overseas or within the Homeland, including:
  - Changes in surrounding landscape, neighboring buildings, adjacent streets, and alternative approaches (foot paths or off road access points).
  - Each new disrupted plot or successful attack offers an opportunity to ensure plans are up to date.



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- Reassessment allows adjusting established response protocols and procedures, and bypassing or breaching barriers to rapid and efficient emergency operations.
- Steady-state-of-information sharing across all stakeholders plays a critical role in attack identification, mitigation, and response, as well as in effective communication, utility services redundancy, and incident recovery.

**USE OF TECHNOLOGY:** While staff and guest vigilance is key to identification and prevention of terrorist activity, technology also plays a crucial role in ensuring a safe and secure environment. CCTV, long-established as a basic safety measure offering general surveillance, with more sophisticated advancements, can detect abandoned baggage, identify pre-registered guests, employees, and authorized deliveries, and detect activity in restricted areas. Technology alone, however, will not manage all security concerns because the most sophisticated systems may be circumvented by a determined adversary.





# **PRODUCT FEEDBACK FORM**

(U) JCAT MISSION: To improve information sharing and enhance public safety. In coordination with the FBI and DHS, collaborate with other members of the IC to research, produce, and disseminate counterterrorism (CT) intelligence products for federal, state, local, tribal and territorial government agencies and the private sector. Advocate for the CT intelligence requirements and needs of these partners throughout the IC.



ADDITIONAL COMMENTS, SUGGESTIONS, OR QUESTIONS. HOW DOES JCAT MAKE PRODUCTS BETTER?

WHAT TOPICS DO YOU RECOMMEND?